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In his scathing dissent from the Supreme Court's 1988 Basic v. Levinson
decision, which adopted a rebuttable fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance
for Section 10(b) securities litigation,'Justice Byron White warned that "the
pitfalls of [the fraud-on-the-market theory] are revealed by previous uses by
the lower courts of the broader versions of the theory. Confusion and
1 "Fraud-on-the-market allows a plaintiff to claim reliance upon the efficiency and integrity of
the stock market in making an investment purchase." E.g. Russell Robinson, Comment, Fraud-on-the
Market Theory and Thinly Traded Securities Under Rule 10b-5: How Does a Court Decide if Stock Market is
Efficient?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 223 (1990). The term was coined by Judge Patrick
Higginbotham. See id. at 223 n.3. For an excellent explication of the fraud-on-the-market theory, see
generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the
Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REv. 1017, 1929 (1991).
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contradiction are inevitable when traditional legal analysis is replaced with
economic theorization by the federal courts." 2 Justice White cautioned that
federal courts "are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a
statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory" because they have
"no staff economists, no experts schooled in the 'efficient-capital-market
hypothesis,' and no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies."
3
Since Basic, federal courts have sought to evaluate Section 10(b) cases
without living up to Justice White's prognostication. Assisted by Special
Masters and expert witnesses, federal courts have taken a detailed, methodi-
cal approach to evaluating the economic theory underlying the fraud-on-
the-market rule. This is particularly evident in a line of recent cases in
which defendants sought orders from federal judges denying class certifica-
tion4 on the grounds that the market for the predicate security was not
efficient?5 In so doing, defendants seek to arrest litigation through class
decertification without engaging in the difficult task of rebutting the pres-
umption of reliance by demonstrating that plaintiffs traded or held securities
for reasons other than their faith in the integrity of the market price.6
This article evaluates the performance of federal courts in assessing
market efficiency.7 WhileJustice White feared that courts' subpar economic
2 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988).
3 See id. at 253. (Justice White's skepticism received considerable support in the legal literature.)
See, e.g., Nathaniel Carden, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995for Judicial
Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (1998) ("This Comment argues that the PSLRA
provides evidence of congressional distrust of the ECMH, and that courts - institutions that are less
technically proficient and less democratically accountable than Congress - should defer to Congress's
skeptical view.").
4 Under the federal rules of civil procedure, a plaintiff class must move for class certification
before a districtjudge. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
s See, e.g., Serfaty v. Int'l Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418 (D. Utah 1998) (denying class
certification); cf O'Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479 (D. Mich. 1996) (denying class certification); cf
Freeman v. Leventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying class certification). But see,
Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, 823 F.Supp. 353 (D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to deny class
certification); c. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264 (D. NJ. 1989) (refusing to deny class
certification). This issue, of course, was raised and addressed by courts prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Basic. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (D. Tex. 1980) (certifying class over
objection that market for predicate security was not efficient). By the time it reached the Supreme Court,
Basic itself was a class certification case, as pointed out by the court in O'Neil: "The very purpose of the
grant of certiorari was 'to determine whether the courts below properly applied the presumption of
reliance in certifying the class .... ' O'Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 497 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 230).
6 One of the main reasons this is so hard to do is that sophisticated plaintiffs' firms are sure to
identify at least some class member whose investment behavior could not be said to have been influenced
by factors other than the market price.
7 By market efficiency, I mean that all "economically relevant public information about a
publicly traded security is rapidly absorbed by investment professionals and immediately reflected in the
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analysis would lead them to approve too many Section 10(b) actions," courts'
decisions as to the efficiency of particular security markets have turned out
to be highly variable. Given remarkably similar facts, courts' assessment of
market efficiency range from findings of inefficiency to findings of
efficiency. If anything, courts seem to be approving toofetv Section 10(b)
actions, exactly the opposite of whatJustice White predicted.
I explore several candidate explanations for courts' inability to consis-
tently adjudicate market efficiency. First, I consider whether the courts' lack
of economic expertise leads them to apply poorly a test which, applied more
rigorously, might produce accurate results. I suggest that while the courts
in question may appear to be sufficiently sophisticated to discern the level of
efficiency in a securities market, in fact they are not. The courts embrace a
laundry list of factors economists have suggested as indicators of market
efficiency, but fail to show an aptitude for considering these factors in a
deeper, contextual fashion. On a related level, courts' insecurity about their
own aptitude may lead them to rely excessively on special masters and
experts. Variability could result from reliance on the opinions of such
individuals, in no small part because such individuals bring their own
particular biases to the table.
Second, I consider whether the test courts use to evaluate efficiency is
internally flawed. If the test does not produce accurate results, it is no
surprise that courts reach variable conclusions. I explore whether the
variability ofjudicial decisions on efficiency may arise because the efficient
markets hypothesis was never, in fact, valid. If securities simply do not trade
on efficient markets, there is no reason to expect courts to evaluate efficiency
in any sort of consistent fashion. Exploring this possible explanation
suggests what may be a serious problem in courts' use of economic theory:
how to deal with the conflict between legal precedent declaring a particular
theory valid and subsequent econometric evidence undercutting that
premise. Analogous to the post-originalist problem in constitutional
price of that security in an unbiased fashion." Robinson, supra note 1, at 224. The Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) should now be familiar to students of corporations and securities law.
Derived from the work of Nobel laureate financial economists such as Harry Markowitz, Merton Miller
and William Sharpe, see Mark L. Mitchell &Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities
Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545 (1994). The ECMH
now takes three forms: weak, strong, and semi-strong. Under a weak-form ECMH, stock prices reflect
all past information about stock prices. Under a strong form ECMH, stock prices reflect all information
about the underlying company, whether public or private (since insiders presumably trade on non-public
information and market-watchers respond to insider moves). Under the semi-strong ECMH, stock
prices reflect all information publicly available about the company. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 383 (1970).
8 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 256.
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interpretation, the difficulty of abrogating precedent to keep up with
developments in economic theory may explain courts' difficulty in
evaluating consistently market efficiency.
In Part I, I begin with Cammer v. Bloom,9 the NewJersey federal district
court case that first analyzed systematically the efficiency of a particular
security's public market. I then describe subsequent cases employing the
same or related tests, and argue that similar factual circumstances have led
to different conclusions by courts about market efficiency. In Part II, I
explore the first candidate explanation: that courts lack the sophistication
needed to apply these factors consistently, and are perhaps subject to the
excessive influence of special masters and expert witnesses. In Part III, I
explore the second candidate explanation: that the Cammer factors are
internally flawed, perhaps because the efficient markets hypothesis is not
valid.
While other authors have addressed generally the way in which courts
should evaluate market efficiency,'" none have engaged in a close reading
and detailed consideration of the recent class (de)certification and summary-
judgment motion decisions." While several studies have engaged Cammer
using empirical financial economics, none have considered that case in
conjunction with later cases exploring the same question. By focusing on
how theory meets reality in the post-Cammer world, I aim to make an
original contribution.
I. CAMMER V. BLOOM AND OTHER POST-BASIC CASES ASSESSING
MARKET EFFICIENCY
Traditionally, plaintiffs alleging fraud needed to prove, among other
things, that they relied upon the misleading statements of defendants.'2 In
Basic, the Court relieved securities fraud plaintiffs from this obligation,
allowing plaintiffs to rely instead on the "integrity of the market price' 3 of
an efficient security. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, when the
9 See Cammer, 711 F.Supp. 1264.
,o See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common
Stocks'Efficiency, 19J. CORP. L. 285 (1994); Victor L. Bernard, Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis:
Limits to the Applicability ofFraud-on-the-Market Theory, 73 NEB. L. REv. 781 (1994).
" See Michael W. Prozan & Michael T. Fatale, Revisiting "Truth in Securities": The Use of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 687 (1992) (comparing the use of ECMH by the
SEC and the courts various approaches to market efficiency, although not providing detail as to the
variability of court decisions).
12 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 223 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SS 525-30
(1977)).
13 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
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security's market is efficient, the price of a security will adequately reflect all
information on the security; including any false information.14 When the
security's market is not efficient, in contrast, misleading statements do not
necessarily find their way into market price and the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance would not apply.'5 However, the Basic Court did
not provide any factors by which lower courts could evaluate the efficiency
of a particular security's market.'
6
In this, the positive section of the article, I offer a description and close
reading of the first post-Basic7 district court case to come up with a formal
method for evaluating the efficiency of the market for a security, Cammer.
I then describe subsequent cases following and evaluating the Cammer
factors. Despite similar factual circumstances, these cases reach a variety of
conclusions about market efficiency. While variability in the law may not be
as bad as a systematic bias in favor of plaintiffs or defendants, it undercuts
the faith both holders of securities and corporations have in the courts and
induces inefficiency because it makes planning difficult. Because it also
14 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 224.
is See Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1263-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Robinson, supra note 1, at 227, 235 ("To say that a fraud-on-the-market theory claim should stand
without an efficient market digestingthe false information behalfofinvestors has the effect ofdoing away
with reliance altogether."). Writing shortly after Basic, Jonathan R. Macey wrote that "the issue of
whether a particular stock traded in an efficient market will now become an important part of every
fraud-on-the-market case .... But we have yet to observe a workable test for determining whether the
market for a particular security is efficient." Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: Some
Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 923,925 (1989). See also O'Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 500 (D.
Mich. 1996) ("The linchpin of the fraud-on-the-market theory is the existence of an efficient market.").
16 See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIE FRAUD S 8.6
(Aug. 1988) (noting the absence of a legal standard for assessing market efficiency). The Court did
incorporate in affirming the Sixth Circuit's a requirement that the plaintiffallege and prove that "the
shares were traded on an efficient market." E.g., Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
As Russell Robinson explains, the Sixth Circuit merelycited a Note from the Harvard Law Review stating
that "the fraud-on-the-market theory should not be extended... to inefficient markets," Note, Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1982), with "no guidance beyond that... offered." Robinson,
supra note 1, at 234. See also Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of
Common Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 288 (1994) ("[T]he Court did not elaborate on the
operational means of proving market efficiency.").
17 Prior to Basic's embrace of fraud-on-the-market, several courts set forth general factors for
evaluating market efficiency. For example, in the case ofLTVSecurities, a federal district court embraced
fraud-on-the-market but confined its holding to securities with "active and substantial markets." In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 134, 146 (D. Tex. 1980). The court provided limited guidance for
subsequent evaluations of market efficiency, concentrating on three issues: (1) whether the company or
the market sets the price for the security, (2) whether there are a large number of market participants,
and (3) whether there are a large there is a sufficient supply of reliable information Id. at 143-44.
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makes it more difficult to price lawsuits, variability in legal results make
settlement less likely and thus raises litigation costs.
A. Cammer v. Bloom
The members of the plaintiff class had invested in over-the-counter
common stock of Coated Sales, Inc., a company that sold treated fabrics
from its home state of NewJersey. 8 The company was incorporated in 1984
and in 1988 filed for bankruptcy' 9 after discrepancies were discovered in its
finances: it had entered revenues on its books before shipping product to
customers;20 and falsely reported the acquisition of a $6 million piece of
machinery which was never actually acquired.2' After these facts were
revealed to the public, the value of the company's stock dropped 17%, or 2
1/8 points per share.
The investor class filed suit against the company, its officers, and its
accounting firm, alleging violations of Rule 10b-5 and various state laws.
Peat Marwick, the accounting firm, challenged the request for class certifica-
tion because the stock for Coated Sales did not trade on an efficient market.
The accounting firm argued that the court should adopt one of two bright-
line tests: not apply the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance where the
company failed to file an S-3 form with the SEC; 2 or not apply the theory
where the stock of the company trades on an over-the-counter market.
The court "declined to accept bright-line tests for determining effi-
ciency, "23 and instead culled five factors from the financial literature to
compose a multi-part test. The court refused to declare all OTC stocks as
trading on inefficient markets, and pointed out that some ofAmerica's most
widely held and followed stocks - such as Apple Computer and MCI - trade
on an OTC basis. 24 The court also refused to say those companies not
eligible to file S-3 forms trade on inefficient markets." The defense's
argument on this point had some merit, in that the SEC, in recognition of
the efficient markets hypothesis, adopted the S-3 form.2 6
18 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1270
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1272.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 1284-85.
23 Robinson, supra note 1, at 243. The court's approach has been praised by commentators. See,
e.g., id., at 245.
24 Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1281.
25 Id. at 1284-85.
26 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 229-30. See also Weilgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892
F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission believes that markets
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The five factors the court settled upon to compose its test were: 7 average
weekly trading volume, 8 the number of security analysts who follow the
stock, market makers active in the stock,' eligibility to file form S-3,3 ° and
historical showing of immediate price response to unexpected events or
financial releases.3 For several of these factors, the Cammer court incorpo-
rated quantitative rubrics from the Bromberg treatise which could be used
to determine when a particular factor supports or undermines efficiency: if
more than 1% if a security'sfloat turns over on a weekly basis, that suggests
efficiency; 32 if five market makers trade in a stock that probably suggests
efficiency, while ten strongly suggests efficiency. 33  The Cammer court
applied these factors and decided that the market was efficient, at least for
the sake of the defense's motion for summary judgment.
B. Variable Results of Subsequent Cases
What would it mean for the Cammer test to produce variable results?
One possibility would be that two markets are both efficient, and yet the test
reaches different conclusions about their efficiency. A second possibility
would be that two markets are both inefficient, and yet the test reaches
different conclusions about their efficiency. A third possibility would be
that one market is efficient and the other is not, and yet the test reaches the
same conclusion about their efficiency.
Evaluating the degree of variability in courts' decisions is somewhat
problematic, in that the Cammer court gave no indication of how many of its
factors needed to suggest efficiency for a fraud-on-the-market presumption
correctly value the securities of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has
been digested and expressed in the security's price.").
V Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1285-87.
28 The more actively a security trades, the higher the likelihood that value-relevant information
about it will be generated by analysts, who could take advantage of large volume to obtain generous
compensation. See Barber et al., supra notes 10, 16.
2 Since market makers, who sell securities over-the-counter, have a strong incentive to and a
strong position from which they can be up to date on the financial information of the securities they
market. See Barber et al., supra notes 10, 16.
30 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31 The Cammer court considered an immediate stock price shift in response to unexpected
corporate news or financial releases "the essence of an efficient market and the foundation of the fraud
on the market theory .... " Cammer, 711 F.Supp at 1289. Obviously, this factor will require the courts
to consider technical, economic data. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 250-51.
32 See Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1293; Simpson, 823 F.Supp. at 355.
33 Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1293.
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of reliance to apply.-4 Are courts results variable if in one case three factors
suggest efficiency, and the court finds no efficiency, while in another, two
factors suggest efficiency and the court finds efficiency? Rather than
beginning with a vision of how to define variability, I start by analyzing the
cases. My working hypothesis is something along the lines of what one
Justice said about a significantly less sterile subject: "I'll know it when I see
it."
I begin by summarizing the facts of the nine cases that make up the
sample studied in this article.3s I then tabulate the exogenous variables
(indicators of efficiency) and the endogenous variable (whether the court
finds efficiency) in an effort to reveal any variability in court decisions.
1. SIPSON V. SPECL4LTY RETAIL CONCEPTS 36
In response to a class-action securities fraud suit, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffclass was not entitled to the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion of reliance because the market for Specialty Retail Concepts shares was
not efficient.37 Lacking Fourth Circuit precedent on the issue, the North
Carolina District Court adopted the Cammer test3" and concluded, for the
purpose of summary judgment, that the market for Specialty stock was
efficient. 9
The court acknowledged that the firm's inability to file an S-3 form and
trading volume of .75% of outstanding shares "tend to support the conclu-
sion that the market ... was not efficient or information hungry."40 But the
court allowed that ajury might consider the fact that the stock price fell after
the unexpected resignation of Specialty's accountants and the six firms that
acted as market makers for the security over a two year period as evidence
of efficiency.4
34 By rejecting the bright-line test of S-3 registration eligibility, the Cammer court explicitly ruled
that not all of the factors need be satisfied. Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1287. Later courts have concluded
that just one of the Cammer factors needs to be satisfied for a market to be found efficient. See In Re
2TheMart, Inc., Sec. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
35 This collection of cases is not meant to be comprehensive. Other cases have considered
efficiency. For some cases not discussed in this paper, see Prozan & Fatale, supra note 11. I selected cases
which included some discussion of the reasons for finding markets efficient, in order to be able to
determine whether courts' decisions could be said to be variable in the face of similar facts.
36 Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, 823 F.Supp. 353 (D. N.C. 1993).
37 Id. at 354.
38 Id.




2. FREEMAN V. LAVENTHOL & HORWATH 42
Defendants sold and underwrote municipal bonds to the plaintiff class
for the construction of the North River Retirement Center in Eastern
Kentucky.43 North River quickly descended into insolvency, and the
plaintiffs sued, alleging that defendants knew the market could not support
the retirement home, that defendants set fees for residents at a level the
market could not bear, and that several defendants neglected to disclose their
ties to another failed retirement-home project."
The court ruled that fraud-on-the-market would not apply to financial
instruments traded on inefficient markets." The court then turned to
whether the instruments at issue in the case - municipal bonds trading on
a primary market (that is, the initial market created by the sale of bonds) -
could be said to be traded in an efficient market.' The court cited Cammer,
adopted its five-factor test, " and concluded that the primary market for
municipal bonds is not efficient under the Cammer criteria.48
3. SERFATY V. INTERNATIONAL AUTOMATED SYSTEMS, INC. 49
The President of International Automated Systems, Inc. made certain
representations in 1996 which the plaintiff class alleged were aimed at
inflating the stock price." The federal district court denied the investors'
motion to be certified as a class, in part on the ground that the presumption
of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory was not appropriate
because the stock did not trade efficiently.?' Applying the Cammner factors,
the court considered the testimony of an expert for the plaintiffs that more
than 70,000 shares were traded, on average, in a given week during the "class
period."5 2 The court found that since there were no analysts covering the
42 Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
43 Id. at 196.
4 See id.
45 See id. at 197.
4 See id. at 198.
47 See id. at 199.
4 See id.
49 Serfaty v. Int'l Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418 (D. Utah 1998).
so Id. at 419.
s1 Id. at 418.
52 See id. at 421.
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stock and since the share price showed no clear response to new information
over the relevant period, the stock did not trade efficiently. 3
4. O)NEIL V.APPEL54
Plaintiffs were purchasers of common stock and stock purchase warrants
ofEmbrace Systems Corporation, a Michigan-based plastics manufacturer.
They sued former directors, officers and employees of Embrace, as well
Price Waterhouse, Embrace's certified public accountant.56 The plaintiffs
made several allegations: that defendants misrepresented the status of a
product, stating that manufacturing operations had begun and making a
series of groundless predictions about future sales and profits;57 misrepre-
sented the capital structure of the company; 8 seriously overstated the value
of certain assets;59 falsely claimed an institutional investor had agreed to
purchase $20 million of Embrace common stock;6 and made a series of
misrepresentations on forms filed pursuant to its disclosure obligations with
the SEC.61
The court decided that it should conduct a preliminary factual inquiry
"into the likely availability of the fraud-on-the-market theory in order to
determine whether common issues truly will predominate in this case."62
After applying the Cammer factors, 63 the court "conclude[d] that [the]
plaintiffs have virtually no chance of succeeding on this theory."64 Though
Embrace stock traded on the NASDAQ system, the court held that it was
thinly traded.65 The court appears to have been swayed by the testimony of
a defense expert, who argued that the stock did not share the efficiency
53 See id.
54 O'Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479 (D. Mich. 1996).
ss Id. at 483.





61 The plaintiffs attacked the company's audited financial statements, Form 10-Q's, Form 10-
Ks, Form 8-K's, Form S-8's, and the like. See id.
62 See id. at 498.
63 While the O'Neil court adopted the Cammer factors, it explicitly rejected the "rules of thumb"
from the Bromberg treatise which Cammer had incorporated: "(Bloth [the defense's expert] and [the
plaintiffs expert] testified that the rules of thumb suggested by Bromberg and Lowenfelds (sic) have no
support in the economic literature. Therefore, I reject their rules of thumb as being unsupported
speculation." Id. at 502.
64 See id. at 500.
65 See id. at 486.
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characteristics of large, publicly traded companies.' The court noted that
there were no analysts covering the stock,67 that there were seven to twenty-
eight market makers transacting in the stock at a given time, 68 that the
company was not eligible to file an S-3 form,69 and concluded that the
security at issue did not trade on an efficient market.
5. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY II SECURITIES LITIGATION °
In this California class decertification decision, the court apparently
found the underlying security traded on an inefficient market.7' This case
was complicated in that part of the analysis involved the defense's Truth-on-
the-Market claim (that the market did not believe its misstatements) and its
argument that its curative disclosures to the market relieved it of liability for
misstatements in connection with the sale of a security.72 Seagate was a
manufacturer of disk drives for personal computers.
73
The court concentrated on an unrebutted econometric study by a
defense expert that indicated that none of the statements made by the
defendants during the class period affected the price of the stock.74 The
court either, therefore, concluded that the market was inefficient (in which
case class decertification was appropriate since fraud-on-the-market would
not apply) or accepted the Truth-on-the-Market defense.
6. INRE 2THEMART SECURITIES LITIGATION
75
This recent case concerned an internet company formed to engage in
direct competition with online auction sites such as eBay.com. 76 The
nascent company acquired a publicly traded entity, CDRom Yearbook Inc.,
and used that acquisition as a shell company, changing its name and taking
its place as a publicly traded company on the NASD Electronic Bulletin
Board.7 Based on representations in company press releases, the price of
66 See id at 486-487.
67 See id. at 501.
M See id. at 502.
69 See id.
70 In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F.Supp. 1341 (D. Cal. 1994).
71 See generally, id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 1368.
75 In re 2TheMart Sec. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 965.
76 Id. at 958.
n Id.
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2TheMart shares increased dramatically, peaking at $50 on January 20,
1999.78 Subsequent audits revealed that the company had no revenues,
substantial obligations and called into question its future as a going
concern.79  After shareholders filed suit under the securities laws on
February 18, 1999, the defendant made a motion to dismiss, arguing, in part,
that the shares for 2TheMart stock did not trade efficiently.'m
The court followed the Ninth Circuit's adoption of Cammer; however,81
the court did not perform a five-factor test but rather focused only on the
fifth Cammer factor, historical responsiveness of share price to unanticipated
announcements. 82 The court noted that after a positive announcement
concerning 2TheMart's success at raising capital and that the web site was
in "final development," the stock price increased. s3 After a negative story
appeared in the Los Angeles Times suggesting that 2TheMart's business plan
parroted perfectly that of eBay.com, the company made an announcement
touting the experience of its management and again representing the web
site as in the final stages of development. Again, the court points out, stock
price rose. s4 A third positive announcement also produced gains.8' Then,
a negative story in Bloomberg News reported that members of the founding
team had previously applied to the Nevada Gaming Commission for a
casino license and been rejected, committed tax fraud, used company funds
to finance construction of a personal residence, and pled guilty to conflict of
interest as an attorney.' Stock price fell, then fell again after a delay in the
launch was announced, and then fell yet again after the company's financial
difficulties were disclosed.87 Based on these facts, the court found the
market efficient.88 The court also noted, in a footnote, that the average
weekly volume of shares was 272,989, more than 1% of the total volume of
shares.t 9
78 Id. at 958.
79 Id. at 959.
8D Id. at 963 (citing motion to dismiss at 21-24).
81 The Circuit Court adopted Cammer in Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
82 2TheMart, 114 F.Supp. at 964-65.
83 Id. at 964,
84 Id.
8s Id.
86 Id. at 964-65.




7. MILLER & IYER V. NTN COMMUNICATIONS9
NTN Communications was founded in the early 1980s to develop
multi-player interactive entertainment and education products, such as an
interactive game that viewers of live sports on television could play while
watching a game.91 After hearing news that the company's accountants had
issued warnings about the future viability of the company, holders of NTN
securities, which trade on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), filed suit
based on contingent liabilities allegedly concealed from the public in order
to artificially inflate the stock price. 92 As part of a motion for summary
judgement, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate NTN stock traded on an efficient market.93
The court adopted a presumption that shares trading on the AMEX trade
efficiently.94 Though citing Cammer, the court held that this presumption
would apply "[riegardless of the number of stock analysts who followed
NTN shares during the class period."95 The court also held that the
plaintiffs had carried their burden of showing the efficiency of the market
for NTN shares. 96 The court found that the "severity and timing of the
decline in NTN shares" after the negative audit report was publicized
"directly supports plaintiffs' contention that the AMEX was an efficient
market during the relevant class period."9
8. HOEXTER V. SIMMONS 98
In this case, the holders of Valley National Corporation common stock
obtained class certification over the defense's objection that the over-the-
counter market in which the shares traded was not efficient.99 The plaintiffs
went through a Cammer analysis, which the court unfortunately declined to
detail. °° The court concluded "the OTC market as a whole and the market
90 See Miller & Iyer v. NTN Communications, 1999 U.S. Dist. L.XIS 8968 (S.D. Cal.).
91 See id. at *2.
92 See id.
93 See id. at *29.
94 See id. at *30.
95 Id. at *30.
% Id.
9 Id.
98 See Hoexter v. Simmons, 140 F.R.D. 416 (D. Ariz. 1991).
99 Id. at 419.
100 Id.
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for Valley National shares in particular were sufficiently efficient to allow
plaintiffs to establish reliance by employing that theory."'1 '
9. IN RE MDC HOLDINGS SECURITIES LITIGATION"°
The SEC investigated MDC Holdings, an owner of real estate assets,
for a series of accounting violations.'0 3 Plaintiffs alleged that the company
misrepresented the nature of the SEC's investigations; in any case, when the
full news of the company's conduct reached the markets, the value of MDC
shares fell from $22 tojust $1.'0' Plaintiffs, holders of stock and bonds sold
by the company, sued. The defense moved for class decertification, arguing
in part that the holders of subordinated notes were not entitled to the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance because their securities did not trade
on an efficient market 05
The court considered "evidence obtained during discovery," which
included an expert opinion that "the price of MDC notes fell in response to
the disclosure of negative information [therefore] indicates that the market
in the notes was efficient." 1 6 The court sided with the defense and found
that the market had not been shown to be efficient, suggesting the plaintiffs
should have offered "facts concerning the activity of the notes, the number
of securities analysts reporting on the notes, or the number of market
makers. ,
07
C. Inconsistency as to Inefficiency
In the attached table, I tabulate the independent variables (the Cammer
factors) in these nine cases alongside the dependent variable (the judicial
pronouncement of inefficiency/efficiency). This tabulation suggests some
variability does exist in the courts' adjudications of efficiency.
Perhaps the clearest contrast can be found by comparing the Simpson
case to the O'Neil and Serfaty cases. The securities at issue in both Sefaty and
O'Neil had larger weekly trading volumes (though smaller as a share of total
float) than the security at issue in Simpson. Moreover, more market makers
transacted in the securities at issue in O'Neil and Serfaty. In all three cases,
101 Id.
102 In Re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F.Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
103 Id. at 791.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 804.
106 Id. at 805.
107 Id.
PROVING MARKETS INEFFICIENT
experts disagreed about the historical responsiveness of stock price to
unanticipated corporate announcements, although the judges in O'Neil and
Serfaty sided with the defense experts while the Simpson court sided with the
plaintiffs. Only the number of analysts covering the Simpson security clearly
suggests that the security at issue in that case was any more efficient than the
securities at issue in O'Neil and Sefaty. Yet as the table indicates, the
Simpson court found efficiency, and the O'Neil and Sefaty courts found
inefficiency. The court in O'Neil recognized the tension between these
cases.
108
Two cases decided by federal district courts in the samejudicial district,
NTN, and MDC, also demonstrate the variability ofjudicial decisions on
efficiency. In each of these decisions, thejudge concentrated onjust one of
the Cammer factors - the historical responsiveness of security prices to new
information.1°9 In both cases, the judges looked only at the responsiveness
of the value of the security to the announcements/disclosures that prompted
the litigation at hand. In both cases, the stock price fell because of negative
disclosures. In one case, the court found those facts sufficient to suggest
efficiency, in the other the court found that essentially identical fact pattern
insufficient.
II. COURT'S APTITUDE AT APPLYING THE CAMMER FACTORS
The perennial problem with multi-part tests is that they leave room for
human error on the part of judges attempting to apply precedent subse-
quently. This section explores whether judge's inability to interpret and
apply the Cammer factors may explain the documented variability in courts'
assessment of market efficiency.
A. Judges May Not Understand the Test on a Deeper Level
The most obvious explanation for the variability ofpost-Basic evaluations
of market efficiency is the one Justice White suggested in his dissent: the
judicial branch simply lacks the economic expertise and the resources to
evaluate complex economic concepts on either a theoretical or empirical
level. " ' Following Justice White, scholarly commentators have attacked
judicial competence at evaluating market efficiency."
1o See O'Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 505.
109 Compare Part I(2)(6) with Part 1(2)(8).
110 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
ill See Carden, supra note 3, at 879 (arguing that courts are not "technically proficient" when it
comes to evaluating arguments based on the ECMH). Carden argues that "courts should be reluctant
2002]
318 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:303
The cases described above do show some evidence ofjudicial incompe-
tence. In the 2TheMart case, ajudge ignored all of the Cammer factors but
the historical responsiveness of share price to new information, and
concluded, after looking at just one month of public trading in the com-
pany's stock, that the market was efficient.112 I doubt that one month is a
long enough period to constitute a history along the lines that the financial
economists from whom the Cammer court culled that factor had in mind.
The court looked at the history of the stock, following the literal language of
Cammer, but demonstrated no concern that its sample size was simply too
small. A judge who understood the efficient markets hypothesis more
thoroughly would probably have demonstrated, at least, a bit more hesitation
in that case.
The Miller judge may have made a similar mistake. He based his
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of historical efficiency based
on the predicate security's drop in response to a single unanticipated
announcement. No statistical evidence was considered, and the judge
showed no concern with basing a conclusion on sample with size N = one.
Even if thesejudges cannot be said to be incompetent, there is certainly
a good deal of variation in the competence ofjudges, or, at least, variation in
their dedication to conducting a detailed Cammer analysis. In some cases,
like O'Neil, the opinion explored each of the Cammer factors." 3 In other
cases, judges merely noted that the parties had briefed the Cammer factors,
and then sided with either plaintiff or defendant." 4 While varying degrees
of attention might not necessarily lead to variable results, a plausible
argument could be made that variation in outcome results, on the margin,
from variation in the degree of dedication given the question of efficiency
by particular judges.
Judges may also be hampered by their failure to understand that
"efficiency is not a market or an exchange attribute, but rather a characteris-
tic of a given security during a given period of time. Even for a given
security and time period, efficiency might vary across different information
items." 5 The decisions studied above reveal no discussion of this idea.
Judges treat stock price histories as if all pieces of information were the
same. Moreover, judges do not show any sensitivity to the fact that the
market for a stock, at one time efficient, might not always remain so.
to use the ECMH as the foundation for analyzing securities actions, because they lack the institutional
competence to make such judgments." Id.
112 See infra Part I(2)(6).
113 See infra Part I(2)(4).
114 See infra Part I(2)(7).
115 See Barber et al., supra note 10, at 291.
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Moreover, the Cammer factors are largely descriptive, not predictive, and
judges may miss that distinction. The Cammer factors are characteristics one
would observe about those companies assumed to trade on an efficient
market, but other than the factor that measures the historical responsiveness
of price to unannounced information, none of these factors can be used
directly to predict efficiency. 116  The Cammer court understood that
efficiency needed to be examined by focusing on the market for the
company's securities as a whole. Simply checking off factors, which some
later courts seem to have done, does not capture efficiency well.
This problem is perhaps best illustrated by considering the factor the
Cammer court considered most important: the historical responsiveness of
stock price to unexpected announcement about earnings. Certainly, a
showing that a company's securities responded to such announcements in
the logical fashion would suggest efficiency. Nevertheless, not finding such
responsiveness does not mean that the stock does not trade on an efficient
market. In fact, a hyperefficient market might produce the same pattern.
Unexpected announcements might not influence price if insiders have
already traded on the information, before its release to the public. If a
company's stock trades on a strong-form efficient market, then, this Cammer
factor might fail to capture its efficiency. Courts may not possess the
sophistication to look beyond a statistical study offered into evidence, to
consider other possibilities that might explain the same outcomes.
B. Reliance on Experts and Special Masters
Courts may be capable of conducting evaluations of market efficiency,
yet they might have come to doubt their own competence. Consequently,
courts have tended to rely heavily on the opinions of experts and special
masters.'17 Yet doing so may lead to variability injudicial outcomes, in large
part because experts will inevitably reach varied conclusions in response to
their own political agendas and the financial incentives they have to testify
to a certain point: "Expensive experts with complex equations and long
116 The O'Neil court, for example, bought into the testimony of a defense expert that
concentrated on the dissimilarities between the market for a company's stock and the market for the
stock of large, publicly traded companies. O'Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 486. The plaintiffs argued that the
comparison to large stocks was unfair, to which the court responded that since those stocks were thought
to trade on and efficient market such comparisons were necessary. See id. The more appropriate analysis
would compare Embrace stock to the stock of small companies known to trade on efficient markets. The
plaintiffs were correct to point out that Embrace would never match the larger companies on certain
"indicia of efficiency" (like trading volume) simply by virtue of its smaller size.
117 See infa Part 1(3) (pointing out that courts finding efficiency credited plaintiffs' experts, while
courts finding inefficiency credited defense experts).
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computer printouts are highly likely to reach opposite conclusions" about
market efficiency." 
8
One expert, Charles C. Cox, appears in two of the cases studied, both
times on the side of the defense." 9 Cox is currently employed by Lexecon,
a law-and-economics consulting firm founded by a group of Chicago
economists and law professors.' Cox is a former Commissioner of the
SEC, ' 2' and served as its acting director for a year.1 One can imagine the
impact the testimony from the former chief of the government agency
charged with regulating the securities markets would have on a federal
district judge in a less-populated state. In both cases in which Cox testified,
the presiding federal judges were highly deferential to his opinion about the
inefficiency of the market for the security in question.'23
The testimony of Lexecon experts is particularly interesting since that
company engaged in bitter and personal defamation litigation with the
nation's leading plaintiffs securities litigation firm, Milberg Weiss. The
case, which eventually went all the way to the Supreme Court, resulted in
a settlement in which Milberg Weiss agreed to pay Lexecon $50 million in
cash. 124 Milberg Weiss was involved in several of the cases studied in this
article, such as Hoexter v. Simmons. That Lexecon and plaintiff's firms do not
get along does not prove that Lexecon experts would play fast and loose with
their economic analysis. However, it is possible that such experts are more
strenuous than they otherwise would be (for personal as well as financial
reasons) and that they might thus influence judges, where they testify, to be
more aggressive in denying class certification than the facts warrant.
In the O'Neil case, the federal judge also adopted, verbatim, the opinion
of a federal magistrate judge designated to hear the case, over the objections
of the plaintiff class.12 The O'Neil case demonstrated a fairly high degree of
sophistication so far as the underlying economics of fraud-on-the-market as
well as the Cammer factors; perhaps judicial use of special masters could
increase the accuracy ofjudicial assessments of market efficiency. However,
that somejudges use such masters, while others do not, means variability in
outcome is more likely.
11 4 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 16, at § 8.6.
119 See Serfaty, 180 F.R.D. 418; O'Neil, 165 F.R.D. 479.
120 See Resume of Charles C. Cox, available at http'//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s730 9 8/coxl .htm.
121 See id.
122 See id.
IM See generally, cases cited supra note 5.
124 See Lexecon v. MilbergWeiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
125 O'Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 482-83.
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M. POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE CAMMER TEST
An additional and serious impediment to consistent adjudication of
market efficiency could come from internal flaws in the Cammer test. Two
main possibilities exist. First, the test could include elements that actually
have no bearing on market efficiency.'26 When courts rely on these
extraneous Cammer factors, then, their decisions could tend towards either
false positives or false negatives.
Brad Barber, Paul Griffen, and Baruch Lev published an empirical study
of candidate indicators of market efficiency, in theJournal of Corporation Law.
The authors found that only two of the eight factors they studied - the
average trading volume, and the number of analysts following the security
- "systematically differentiated between inefficiently and efficiently priced
stocks. "1
27
That these two factors were systematically linked to efficiency makes
sense. Average weekly trading volume may indicate a security is of interest
to many investors. One treatise agreed that average weekly trading volume
indicates efficiency, and suggested a numeric test: where 2% of the total
securities on the market trade in a given week, the market should be
considered efficient.12 As analysts are the ones the ECMH depends upon
to translate public information into price, the number of active analysts is
highly likely to affect the degree of market efficiency.
The other factors utilized by the Cammer court - eligibility to file an S-3
form, the existence of market makers for a security, and the historical
responsiveness of share price to new information - were not clearly illogical
choices. The ability of a company to file an S-3 form, for example, has been
praised by both judges and commentators.'29 However, while these criteria
are not illogical, they are certainly "ad hoc."130 Barber, Griffen, and Lev used
the responsiveness of share price to new information as a dependent
126 See Victor Bernard et al., Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Limits to the Applicability
of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 73 NEB. L. REv. 781, (1994) (arguing that a smaller number of factors
than employed in Cammer may be sufficient to indicate market efficiency).
127 See Barber et al., supra note 10, at 285. The authors note, "Our findings are attractive in their
parsimony. They suggest that out of a multitude of possible efficiency indicators, courts should look
closely at just two key variable in considering the market efficiency presumption underlying the fraud-
on-the-market theory." Id. at 310. Adifferent study found that analyst following did not affect efficiency
when included along with the other Cammer factors. See Bernard et al., supra note 126, at 795-96. Only
that study's volume measure had a systematic and statistically significant effect on efficiency.
128 See 4 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 16, at § 8.6, at 641.
129 See Barber et al., supra note 10, at 289 (citing cases and commentary).
130 See id. at 290.
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variable, so their study obviously did not test the accuracy of that measure.1
3
'
However, they did find that the number of market makers had no systematic
bearing on the efficiency of the market for a security.
32
The second possibility is that the Cammer test omitted valuable
indicators of market efficiency, and that resulting "omitted variable bias" is
responsible for the seeming inconsistency in subsequent adjudications of
market efficiency. For example, that institutional investors (for example,
pension funds and mutual funds) own shares of a particular security might
suggest efficiency, as such large investors "have the resources to follow the
financial reports closely and with great expertise."133 Whether they actually
do so is an unanswered empirical question. One empirical study suggested
that when there are eight institutional investors in a security, even if that
security is that of a small, neglected company, it takes on the characteristics of
an efficiently traded security.'
Other potential omitted variables'35 include the size of the firm, the bid-
ask spread, 136 price volatility, and stock price. 37 Empirical evidence suggests
these are not reliable indicators of the efficiency of a market for a particular
security,' 38 and thus are unlikely to be the source of the variability docu-
mented in the previous part.
From a policy perspective, the Cammer factors suffer from an important
flaw related to, but in addition to, their potential to lead to variable results.
These indicators are clearly biased towards suggesting efficiency for large
companies traded on major national exchanges. However, it is in regard to
the stock of small companies, traded over the counter or on non-traditional
exchanges, that the kinds of fraud Rule 10b-5 was designed to avert are most
131 See id.
132 See id. This result surprised the authors, see id., and could be the result of a quirk in their data
set. One treatise argued that, for classification purposes, ten market makers should give rise to a
substantial presumption of efficiency, while five market makers give rise to a more modest presumption.
See 4 Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 16, at § 2.6.
133 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 250.
134 See Edelman & Baker, The Dynamics of Neglect and Return, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 1987,
at 52 (cited in Robinson, supra note 1, at 250). But see Barber et al., supra note 10, at 290 (finding no effect
of institutional holdings on efficiency).
135 See Barber et al., supra note 10, at 290.
136 Larger bid-ask spreads indicate asymmetries of information, which suggest a security does no
trade on a highly efficient market. See id. at 291-92.
137 Empirical research suggests that stocks with low prices may not trade in efficient markets.
See id. at 292. As a result, a low stock price undercuts the efficiency of the market for a particular
security. See id.
138 See Barber et al., supra note 10, at 290.
PROVING MARKETS INEFFICIENT
likely to occur. 39 Of course, such small company investors may receive a
risk premium to compensate them for the higher risk of unprotected loss
trading on such an exchange would involve."4
A. What if No Markets are Efficient?
Perhaps the greatest source of internal inconsistency would arise if the
efficient markets hypothesis itself were not valid. Basic came at the end of
a long line of legal scholarship' that, nearly universally, supported the
efficient capital markets hypothesis of some influential financial
economists. 42 In 1984, one legal scholar was able to write, "Researchers
agree that the efficient capital market model accurately represents the pricing
behavior of stocks." 43
This scholarly consensus has now evaporated. Recently, legal and
financial scholars have questioned the validity of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, and thereby, the very premise of fraud-on-the-market. 1'
Initially, critics pointed out that the early studies of efficient markets, like
those of Professor Fama,45 focused on large corporations traded on the New
139 Cf. Langevoort, infra note 145, at n.164 ("[I]t is likely that the incidence of fraud is relatively
higher among smaller stocks than large ones. This difference, however, is a matter of degree, and
probably a small one.").
140 But see id. at 898 ("A buyer of a small over-the-counter stock no doubt holds the same
expectation of the absence offraud ... and does not act in an appreciably more unreasonable fashion in
so doing.").
141 See e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, UseofModern Finance Theoryin SecuritiesFraud Cases InvolvingActively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549,643 (1982); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977).
142 Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago's Business School authored the classic studies
supporting efficient capital markets. See Eugene Fama, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE, PORTFOLIO
DECISIONS AND SECURITIES PRICES 133-68 (1976); Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25J. FINANCE 383 (1970).
143 See RogerJ. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipefor the Total Mix,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373, 374 (1984) (citation omitted). Six years later, in what was no doubt an
overstatement, Michael Jensen stated, "[T]here is no other proposition in economics which has more
solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis." Michael C.Jensen, Some
Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (quoted in Donald
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
851,853 (1992)).
144 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 143, at 896 ("(T] here is very little empirical data to tell us what
percentage of investors are free riding believers in market efficiency and what percentage are habitually
trying to beat the market. The effect of the fraud-on-the-market presumption as applied, however, is
to assure that both groups are compensated.").
145 See Fama, supra note 17.
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York Stock Exchange.' 46 These early critics suggested that the efficient
market hypothesis, while valid for such stocks did not apply to the markets
for thinly traded securities, small-company stocks, generic stocks, and stocks
traded over the counter (OTC).47
More recently, economists began to question the accuracy of these early
tests using more sophisticated data sets and computer technology. 4 New
generation financial economists soon concentrated on a new theory of stock
prices, the noise theory.'49 Led by Yale's Robert Shiller, this new generation
argued that most investors - even professionals - lack the energy, time, or
expertise to process information on a large number of potential
investments.50 Consequently, fads and trends may influence the price of
securities even more than actual information about the company. 5' Noise,
rather than efficiency, is the inevitable result.
A group of respected young economists - including Andrei Shleifer of
Harvard and Lawrence Summers, now U.S. Treasury Secretary - argued
that even if some investors do possess the aptitude the ECMH presumes,
these sophisticated investors may be able to make money in the short term
by exploiting their understanding of the herd mentality of other, less able
investors. 152 Were such investors to ignore the herd mentality, their own
investments would be vulnerable to price moves precipitated by the herd.
5 3
Therefore, even these sophisticated investors will appear, at times, to behave
irrationally, leading to afeedback effect which enhances the inefficiency of the
market.
The consensus now appears to be turning away from efficient markets.
"Not surprisingly, overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that capital
markets are not fundamentally efficient. In fact, more price changes, for
both individual stocks and the market as a whole, appear to be unrelated to
the release of any fundamental information."' 4
146 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 230 (recounting that early studies concentrated on stocks like
IBM or General Motors).
147 See id.
148 See Langevoort, supra note 143, at 853. See also Bernard, supra note 126, at 786-91 ("More
recently, challenges to the efficient market hypothesis have been taken much more seriously.").
149 See id. at 868.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id. at n.60 and accompanying text (describing the findings of, among others, J. Bradford
De Long et at., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990);J. Bradford De Long
et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64J. Bus. 1 (1991);Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence
H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. FIN. EcON. PERSP. 19 (Spring 1990)).
153 See id. at 869-71.
154 See Baruch Lev & Meiringde Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic
and Policy Analysis, 477 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994).
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B. The Problem of Economic Theory as Precedent
In Basic, the Supreme Court in effect declared valid, as a matter of law,
the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis. 55 Because the
Supreme Court's pronouncements have precedential weight, problems arise
when later studies fail to confirm the economic theory underlying earlier
rulings. If a previous ruling was based on erroneous dismal science, does new
research automatically undercut the precedent, even if the Court itself never
says so? Alternatively, must the Court actually and explicitly recognize the
new research and formally overturn its own precedent?
A related problem has recently emerged in constitutional law, as the
Supreme Court has increasingly adopted a process of interpretation based
on the original intent of the founding fathers. 156 Whenever the Court makes
a constitutional ruling based on what historical evidence indicates about the
Framer's intent, it opens its ruling to criticism upon discovery of new
historical evidence contradicting the Court's stated version of the original
intent behind a constitutional provision. 157 As the Justices themselves are
split on how to respond to new historical evidence undercutting their earlier
pronouncements of original intent,' it is understandable that lower courts
would be tentative and reach inconsistent results.
Some scholars support a Protestant approach, in which new historical
evidence commands abrogating outdated precedents.5 9 Others support a
Catholic approach, in which pronouncements of original intent are binding
155 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 ("Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress'
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and hence, any material misrepresentations.") (emphasis added). As Macey and Miller
explain, the Court was adopting the semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
whether it was aware it was doing so or not." Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance,
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1078 (1990). It is
worth asking whether there was a need for the Basic court to make any statements about the ECMH.
After all, an earlier decision adopting fraud-on-the-market had done so without any such reference,
"finding it necessary only to state (without resort to citation) that prices respond to information causing
harm when there is fraud." Langevoort, supra note 143, at 900.
156 See generally Emil Kleinhaus, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional
Law, 110YALEL.J. 121 (2000).
157 See id. at 123 ("Historians' understanding of the Constitution and its amendments develops
as they interpret and synthesize documentary evidence. Further, since research about particular historical
questions intensifies afterJustices 'declare' history, historical conclusions that are incorporated into the
law can be particularly vulnerable.") (citation omitted).
158 See id. at 124.
159 See id.
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even after the emergence of new and contradictory historical evidence. 16° In
the context of new evidence of market efficiency or inefficiency, the
Protestant approach is arguably superior. After all, if the fraud-on-the-
market theory was adopted to enhance the efficiency of the securities laws,
ignoring new evidence about the validity of economic theories would tend
to undermine efficiency.
The pattern of variability documented in this article may result from
lower courts' growing sense that the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
is not all it has been cracked up to be. While none of the cases studied in
this article directly cited recent scholarship questioning whether even the
semi-strong ECMH applied to even the largest stock trading systems, the
growing wave of anti-ECMH sentiment may lurk behind courts' inconsis-
tent results. As one scholar wrote, "In many ways our culture acts as if
'economists proved the efficient market hypothesis a decade ago and moved
on to other topics entirely, so that all that is left is for the law to come into
conformity with this intellectual orthodoxy.'' 16' The ECMH need not be
wrong to produce inconsistent results in the nation's courts." So long as
courts are uncomfortable with legal precedent founded on a dubious theory,
they might follow such precedent in an inconsistent manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Cammer was handed down, courts across the country have sought
to apply it to markets for a variety of securities. Unfortunately, for
rationality in the law, for the reasons suggested in this article, courts have
been unable to adjudicate market efficiency in a thoroughly consistent
fashion.
This article did not set out to argue for or against fraud-on-the-market.
Nor did it set out to establish a means by which variability in judicial
assessment of securities market efficiency could be reduced. However, by
suggesting candidate sources for variability in the outcomes of courts'
assessments of market efficiency, this article does suggest some preliminary
ways to reduce this problem. The first step would be to increase judicial
understanding of efficiency theory and the basis for the Cammer factors.
One way to achieve this higher level of understanding would be for a
160 Just as the Catholic church's interpretation of the Bible is binding even after new evidence
contradicts that interpretation. See id. at 124 (citing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988)).
161 See Langevoort, supra note 143, at 854-55 (citation to earlier work by same author omitted).
162 See id. at 855-56 ("That the current economics literature is heavily populated by efficiency
critics and noise theorists proves only their prominence, not their correctness.").
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prominent jurist, respected on matters of law and economics (say, Judges
Posner or Easterbrook, orJudge Higginbotham, who coined fraud-on-the-
market in the first place) to write a Cammer-type opinion which goes into
great detail about how to apply the Cammer factors. The Supreme Court
could alsojump into the fray, granting cert. on a case involving the Cammer
factors, and seek to give the test greater clarity (and review its components
to make certain none of the variables are improperly included and that no
variables are improperly omitted).
An alternative approach would be to get courts out of the business of
judging market efficiency altogether. One commentator argued that the
"question of the securities markets' informational efficiency- fundamentally
a question for financial economics - should be left to financial
economists." 163 Perhaps courts should cease ruling on market efficiency as
a matter of law, and instead await detailed courtroom testimony by financial
economists, leaving consideration of the whether markets are efficient to the
finder of fact.
The most effective solution, of course, would be for the Supreme Court
to revisit the issue. In Basic, the court based its adoption of the fraud-on-
the-market theory on what it perceived to be an empirical reality of efficiency.
Instead, the court could have adopted fraud-on-the-market on the basis of
its aspiration for efficiency. Fraud arguably makes markets less efficient, by
reducing investors' willingness to trade based on information. Private suits
- because of the threat of large damages - arguably deter fraud, but this
deterrence will not be effective if plaintiffs must prove individualized
reliance. Therefore, the court could have said that it would pretend that
markets are efficient, and therefore allow fraud-on-the-market as a
presumption, so that markets become more efficient. This "legal fiction"
approach would remove courts from the task of evaluating efficiency and
arguably better serve the pro-plaintiff leanings of Basic.
However, to the extent that variability in post-Cammer adjudications
results not from flaws in the institutional competence of the judiciary but
rather from flaws in efficiency theory itself, further exposition of the Cammer
factors will not eliminate variability in judicial outcomes. It may be that
variability is here to stay, so long as fraud-on-the-market remains good law.
163 See Carden, supra note 3.
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APPENDIX A
CASE Average Weekly Number of Eligibility Active Market Immediate Found
Trading Volume Securities to File Makers In the Responsiveness Emcient?
Analysts Form S-3 Stock of the Stock
Following Price to New
the Stock Information
Cammer v. 750,000 shares Substantial No, but 11 Yes
Bloom (D. (5.8% of interest at probable if
N.J. 1990) outstanding least 15 the
shares) research company
reports on had lasted
the company longer
Freeman v. No active public Unclear from No Unclear from No (newly No
Laventhol & trading the record the record issued
Horwath (6th instnument)
Cir. 1990)
Simpson v. 14,000 shares At least three No Six over a two Dramatic drop Yes
Specialty (.75% of year period, after unexpected
Retail (D. outstanding but not all at resignation of
N.C. 1993) 1 shares) the same time accountant
Serfaty v. Approximately None No Four Conflicting No
IAS, Inc. (D. 74,000 shares continuously, expert testimony
Utah 1998) (Between .5% six others over
and.8% of a two month
out- nding period
shares)
Seagate unclear from the unclear from unclear unclear from Misstatements No
Technology II record the record from the the record did not affect the
Securities record price of the
Litigation (D. security during
Cal. 1994) 1 the class period
O'Neil v. 39,627 (.08% of None No Seven to 28 Conflicting No
Appel (D. outstanding expert testimony
Mich. 1996) shares)
In re 272,989 (more unclear from unclear unclear from yes, according to yes
2TheMarL than one percent the record from the the record the court
com, Inc. of outstanding record
(C.D. Cal. shares)
2000) 1 1
NTN 148,026 unclear from unclear unclear from yes, based on the yes
Securities the record from the the record decline
(S.D. Cal. (court rejects record (following a
1999) as relevant) negative release)
that led to the
litigation
Hoexter v. unclear from the unclear from unclear unclear from unclear from the yes
Simmons (D. record the record from the the record record
.Ariz. 1991) _____ record _______ _______
IDC unclear from the unclear from unclear unclear from yes, according to no
Holdings record the record from the the record plaintiff's expert
(S.D. Cal. record
1990)
